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Abstract—In the context of the ‘selfish-mine’ strategy pro-
posed by Eyal and Sirer, we study the effect of propagation
delay on the evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain. First, we use
a simplified Markov model that tracks the contrasting states of
belief about the blockchain of a small pool of miners and the
‘rest of the community’ to establish that the use of block-hiding
strategies, such as selfish-mine, causes the rate of production of
orphan blocks to increase. Then we use a spatial Poisson process
model to study values of Eyal and Sirer’s parameter γ, which
denotes the proportion of the honest community that mine on a
previously-secret block released by the pool in response to the
mining of a block by the honest community. Finally, we use
discrete-event simulation to study the behaviour of a network
of Bitcoin miners, a proportion of which is colluding in using
the selfish-mine strategy, under the assumption that there is a
propagation delay in the communication of information between
miners.
Keywords—Bitcoin, blockchain, block hiding strategies, honest
mining, selfish-mine.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is a peer to peer electronic payment system in
which transactions are performed without the need for a central
clearing agency to authorize transactions. Bitcoin users con-
duct transactions by transmitting electronic messages which
identify who is to be debited, who is to be credited, and where
the change (if any) is to be deposited.
Bitcoin payments use Public Key Encryption. The payers
and payees are identified by the public keys of their Bitcoin
wallet identities. Each Bitcoin transaction is encrypted and
broadcast over the network. Suppose you receive a transaction
from Mary. If you can decrypt Mary’s message using her
public key, then you have confirmed that the message was
encrypted using Mary’s private key and therefore the message
indisputably came from Mary. But how can you verify that
Mary has sufficient bitcoins to pay you?
The Bitcoin system solves this problem by verifying
transactions in a coded form in a data structure called the
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blockchain, which is maintained by a community of partici-
pants, known as miners.
It can happen that different miners have different versions
of the blockchain, something which occurs because of prop-
agation delays, see Decker and Wattenhofer [1]. For Bitcoin
to be able to function, it is essential that these inconsistencies
are resolved within a short timescale. We are interested in how
the inconsistencies arise and how they are resolved (1) when
all participants are acting according to the Bitcoin protocol,
and (2) when a pool of participants is using the ‘selfish-mine’
strategy proposed by Eyal and Sirer [2].
A. The blockchain
At the heart of the Bitcoin system is the computational
process called mining, which involves the solution of a
computationally-difficult cryptographic problem. Bitcoin min-
ers receive copies of all transactions as they are generated.
They examine the blockchain to investigate the history of
the bitcoins involved in each transaction. If the proposed
transaction has sufficient bitcoin credit, then it is accepted for
incorporation into the block that the miner is currently working
on.
Each transaction is identified with a double SHA-256
hash. Miners gather transactions together and use their hashes,
together with the hash that is at the current head of the
blockchain, as inputs to the cryptographic problem. If a miner
succeeds in solving the problem, it is said to have mined a
block that contains records of all the transactions that were part
of the calculation. The miner receives a reward (currently 25
bitcoins) for accomplishing this, along with a small transaction
fee gathered from each transaction in the block.
The process works as follows. A miner M computes a
block hash h over a unique ordering of the hashes of all the
transactions that it is intending to incorporate into its next
block B. It also takes as input the block solution si−1 at
the head of its current version of the blockchain. Denoting
concatenation of strings by the symbol +, the cryptographic
problem that M has to solve is: compute a SHA-256 hash
si = hash(n+ h+ si−1), (1)
such that si has at least a specified number x of leading zeros
where x ∼ 64. The string n is a random “nonce” value. If si
does not have at least x leading zeros, then n is updated and
si is recomputed until a solution is found with the required
number of leading zeros.
Once mined, the new block is communicated to the mem-
bers of the peer network and, subject to the fine detail of the
rules that we shall discuss in the next section, the new block
is added to the blockchain at each peer. The blockchain thus
functions as a public ledger: it records every Bitcoin payment
ever made.
The objective of the designers of the Bitcoin protocol was
to keep the average rate at which blocks are added to the
long-term blockchain at six blocks per hour. To this end, the
value of x, which reflects the difficulty of the computational
problem inherent in (1), is adjusted after the creation of each
set of 2016 new blocks. If the previous 2016 blocks have been
created at an average rate faster than six blocks per hour, then
the problem is made more difficult, if they have been created at
a slower average rate, then it is made less difficult. The effect
is that the difficulty varies in response to the total amount of
computational power that the community of miners is applying.
The test of whether a particular hash has the required
number of leading zeros is a success/failure experiment whose
outcome is independent of previous experiments. Therefore,
the number of experiments required for the first success is
geometrically distributed and, given that the individual success
probabilities are very low and the time taken to perform an
experiment is correspondingly very small, the time taken to
achieve a success is very well-modelled by an exponential
random variable. It is thus reasonable to model block creation
instants as a Poisson process with a constant rate of six per
hour.
The difficulty of a sequence of blocks is a measure of
the amount of computing effort that was required to generate
the sequence. This can be evaluated in terms of the numbers
of leading zeros that were required when the blocks in the
sequence were created. When Bitcoin was started, miners used
PCs to solve the cryptographic puzzle and earn bitcoins. The
difficulty of the puzzle was increased to limit the rate of
producing bitcoins. Miners started using the parallel processing
capabilities of Graphical Processing Units (GPUs) to solve
the cryptographic puzzle. The difficulty of the puzzle was
increased again. Miners started using General Programmable
Field Arrays (GPFAs). The difficulty was increased yet again.
Today miners use Application Specific Integrated Circuit
(ASIC) computers.
Miners communicate by broadcasting newly-discovered
blocks via a peer-to-peer network. Each miner maintains its
own version of the blockchain based upon the communications
that it receives and its own discoveries. The protocol is
designed so that blockchains are locally updated in such a
way that they are identical at each miner or, if they differ, then
the differences will soon be resolved and the blockchains will
become identical. The way that this process works is explained
in the next subsection.
B. Blockchain rules
The material discussed here is obtained from [3]. The main
branch of the blockchain is defined to be the branch with
highest total difficulty.
• Blocks. There are three categories of blocks
1) Blocks in the main branch: the transactions in
these blocks are considered to be tentatively
confirmed.
2) Blocks in side branches off the main branch:
these blocks have tentatively lost the race to
be in the main branch.
3) Blocks which do not link into the main
branch, because of a missing predecessor or
nth-level predecessor.
Blocks in the first two categories form a tree rooted
at the very first block, which is known as the genesis
block, linked by the reference to the hash of the
predecessor block that each block was built upon. The
tree is almost linear with a few short branches off the
main branch.
• Updating the blockchain. Consider the situation
where a node learns of a new block. This block could
either be mined locally or have been communicated
after being mined at another node. The actions that
the node takes are to:
1) Reject the new block if a duplicate of the
block is present in any of the three block
categories mentioned above.
2) Check if the predecessor block (that is, the
block matching the previous hash) is in the
main branch or a side branch. If it is in neither,
query the peer that sent the new block to ask
it to send the predecessor block.
3) If the predecessor block is in the main branch
or a side branch, add the new block to the
blockchain. There are three cases.
a) The new block extends the main branch:
add the new block to the main branch.
If the new block is mined locally, relay
the block to the node’s peers.
b) The new block extends a side branch but
does not add enough difficulty to cause
it to become the new main branch: add
the new block to the side branch.
c) The new block extends a side branch
which becomes the new main branch:
add the new block to the side branch
and
i) find the fork block on the main
branch from which this side
branch forks off,
ii) redefine the main branch to extend
only to this fork block,
iii) add each block on the side branch,
from the child of the fork block to
the leaf, to the main branch,
iv) delete each block in the old main
branch, from the child of the fork
block to the leaf,
v) relay the new block to the node’s
peers.
4) Run all these steps (including this one) recur-
sively, for each block for which the new block
is its previous block.
header hihash si nonce nihash sj−1 header hj−1
Tx Tx . . . Tx Tx . . .
block Bi
nonce nj−1
block Bj−1
Fig. 1. Mining a block.
C. Blockchain dynamics
Suppose miner Mi is mining block Bi with hash hi
on its version C of the blockchain which has si−1 as its
previous hash, and computes a solution si to the cryptographic
puzzle with nonce ni. Miner Mi will add Bi to C and
broadcast (Bi, ni, hi, si) to the network. When another miner
Mj , who is also working on the blockchain C, receives the
communication, it will compute
s′ = hash(ni + hi + sj−1).
With reference to Figure 1, if s′ = si then miner Mj will
add block Bi to its blockchain C, abandon the block Bj that
it is working on and commence trying to add a block to the
chain CBi. Any transactions in Bj that are not in Bi will be
incorporated into in this new block. Importantly, miners Mi
and Mj now have identical versions of the blockchain.
The existence of propagation delays can upset the above
process, because blocks can be discovered while communica-
tion and validation is in process. Decker and Wattenhofer [1]
measured the difference between the time that a node an-
nounced the discovery of a new block or a transaction and
the time that it was received by other nodes for a period of
operation in the actual Bitcoin network. They observed that the
median time until a node receives a block was 6.5 seconds,
the mean was 12.6 seconds and the 95th percentile of the
distribution was around 40 seconds. Moreover, they showed
that an exponential distribution provides a reasonable fit to the
propagation delay distribution.
Suppose all miners are working on the same version C of
the blockchain and miner Mi mines block Bi at time t. It will
then add Bi to the blockchain C and broadcast block Bi to
all its peers. Suppose that this communication reaches miner
Mj at time t+ δj and that Mj has mined a block Bj at time
t′ ∈ [t, t+ δj).
Miner Mj now knows about two versions CBi and CBj of
the blockchain, which are of the same length. From the point
of view of Miner Mj , the blockchain has split, and we can
think of the node as being in a ‘race’ to see which version of
the blockchain survives.
Miner Mi will build on CBi because this is the version
of the blockchain that it knew about first. However miner, Mj
knew about CBj first, and will attempt to build on this version
of the blockchain. Other miners will work on either CBi or
CBj depending on which version they heard about first. The
‘race’ situation is resolved when the next block B∗ is mined,
say on CBi, and communicated via the peer network. Then
CBiB
∗ will be longer than CBj and all miners will eventually
start building on CBiB∗. It is then likely that the block Bj
will not be part of the longterm blockchain and it will become
an orphan block. Any transactions that are in Bj , but not in
Bi or B
∗
, will be incorporated into a future block.’
The above situation can get more complicated if yet
more blocks are mined while communication is taking place,
although this would require the conjunction of two or more
low-probability events.
A rough calculation based upon the fact that it takes 600
seconds on average for the community to mine a block shows
that we should expect that the probability that a new block
is discovered while communication and validation of a block
discovery is taking place is of the order of 12.6/600 ≈ 1/50,
which is small but not negligible. Given that, on average, 144
blocks are mined each day, we should expect this circumstance
to occur two to three times each day, which accords with the
observed rate of orphan blocks [4].
D. Transaction integrity
In his seminal paper proposing the Bitcoin system [5],
Nakamoto dealt with the issue of transaction integrity. He
proposed that a vendor should wait until his/her payment
transaction has been included in a block, and then z further
blocks have been added to the blockchain, before dispatching
the purchased goods. The rule-of-thumb that has been adopted
is to take z = 6, which roughly corresponds to waiting
for an hour before dispatching the goods. Assuming that the
community can generate blocks at rate λ2, Nakamoto presented
a calculation of the probability PA that an attacker with enough
computing power to generate blocks at rate λ1 < λ2 could
rewrite the history of the payment transaction by creating an
alternate version of the blockchain that is longer than the
community’s version. Unfortunately, Nakamoto’s calculation
is incorrect, a fact that was observed by Rosenfeld in [6].
Let the random variable K be the number of blocks created
by the attacker in the time that it takes the community to
create z blocks. Then, we can get the correct expression for the
probability that the attack is successful by noting that z+K is
the number of Bernoulli trials required to achieve z successes,
with the success probability of an individual trial given by
p ≡ λ2/(λ1 + λ2). It is thus a negative binomial random
variable with parameters p and z.
Now, using Nakamoto’s observation that, conditional on the
attacker having created K blocks when the vendor dispatches
the goods, the probability of the attacker ever being able to
build a blockchain longer than the community blockchain is
(λ1/λ2)
z−K if K < z, and one otherwise, we arrive at the
expression in equation (1) of [6],
PA = 1−
z∑
k=0
(
z + k − 1
z − 1
)(
pz(1− p)k − pk(1 − p)z) . (2)
E. Selfish-mine
It follows from an analysis similar to that in Section I-D
that, if a group of miners control more than half of the total
computer power, they can collude to rewrite the history of the
transactions. There might, however, be ways for a group to
gain an advantage even if it does not control a majority of the
computational power.
In [2], Eyal and Sirer proposed a strategy, called ‘selfish-
mine’, and claimed that, using this strategy, a pool of colluding
‘dishonest’ miners, with a proportion α < 1/2 of the total com-
putational power, can earn a proportion greater than α of the
mining revenue. In this sense, a pool of miners collaborating
in using the selfish-mine strategy can earn more than its fair
share of the total revenue.
In brief, selfish-mine works as follows. When a pool miner
mines a block, it informs its colluding pool of miners, but not
the whole community of miners. Effectively, the mining pool
creates a secret extension of its blockchain, which it continues
to work on. The honest miners are unaware of the blocks in
the secret extension and continue to mine and to publish their
mined blocks and solutions according to the standard protocol.
The computational power available to the honest miners
is greater than that available to the mining pool. So, with
probability one, the public branch will eventually become as
long as the pool’s secret extension. However it is possible
that the secret extension will remain longer than the public
branch in the short term. The mining pool is giving up the
almost certain revenue that it would receive if it published its
recently-mined block in return for a bet that its secret branch
will become long enough for it to take short-term control of
the mining process.
Specifically, if the lead happens to become two or more,
then the pool can publish a single block every time that the
honest community mines a block, and publish two blocks when
its lead is eventually reduced to one. In this way the pool works
on its version of the blockchain while allowing the honest
community to be engaged in a fruitless search for blocks that
have no chance of being included in the long-term blockchain.
The risk to the pool is that, if it has established a lead of
exactly one by mining a block Bp, which it has kept secret,
and then it is informed that the community has mined a block
Bh, the pool may end up not getting credit for the block Bp.
To minimise this risk, the selfish-mine strategy dictates that the
pool should publish the block Bp immediately it hears about
Bh. The pool continues working on Bp itself, and it hopes that
at least some of the honest community will also work on Bp,
so that the pool will get the credit for Bp if an honest miner
manages to extend it.
When Eyal and Sirer [2] modelled the selfish-mine strategy,
they included a parameter γ to denote the proportion of the
honest community that work on Bp after it has been published
according to the scenario described above. They deduced
that the pool can obtain revenue larger than its relative size
provided that
1− γ
3− 2γ < α <
1
2
. (3)
Eyal and Sirer’s analysis did not, however, take propagation
delay into account. Since the honest community has a head
start in propagating Bh before the dishonest miners have even
heard about it and then there is a further propagation delay
before Bp reaches other honest miners, our first intuition was
that γ is likely to be very low in the presence of propagation
delays.
In a survey of subversive mining strategies [7], Courtois
and Bahack state (provisionally) that the claims made for
efficacy of the selfish-mine strategy [2], which is one of
the block discarding attacks studied in [8], are exaggerated.
However, the conclusions presented in [7] concerning the
selfish-mine attack are not based on experimental or modelling
analysis.
The purpose of the rest of this paper is to propose some
simple models that explicitly take propagation delay into
account, which we can use to compare the behaviour of the
Bitcoin network when all miners are observing the standard
protocol with its behaviour if there is a pool following the
selfish-mine strategy.
In next section, we shall introduce and analyse a simple
continuous-time Markov chain model that tracks the contrast-
ing states of belief of a ‘pool’ and the ‘rest of the community’
under the assumption that the pool and the community are
physically-separated so that communication between the pool
and the community takes longer than communication within
the pool and within the community. Effectively, we assume that
there is no communication delay within the pool and within
the community. We conclude that the rate of production of
orphan blocks is likely to be much higher when the pool is
keeping its newly-discovered blocks secret.
In the following Section III, we study the value of Eyal
and Sirer’s parameter γ in a model in which pool miners are
distributed according to Poisson processes in the plane and the
propagation delay between two miners is normally distributed
with a mean that depends on the distance between them.
Finally, in Section IV, we shall report results from a
simulation of a network of 1,000 miners, of which a fraction
form a dishonest pool, again with propagation delays between
all miners that depend on their spatial separation. Some
conclusions and further observations are given in Section V.
II. A SIMPLE MARKOV CHAIN MODEL
In this section we shall describe and analyse a simple
Markovian model that takes into account the separate states
of belief of a ‘pool of Bitcoin miners’ and the ‘rest of the
community’ about the blockchain. We assume that commu-
nication within the pool and within the community always
happens faster than communication between the pool and the
community, effectively taking the propagation delay for the
former type of communication to be zero.
Such a dichotomy between immediate communication
within both the pool and community and delayed communi-
cation from pool to community and vice-versa is unlikely to
be realistic. However, the model is useful because it illustrates
the effect that block-withholding strategies have on the rate
of blockchain splits. In the following Sections III and IV, we
shall analyse models with more realistic assumptions about
communication delay.
If the pool and the rest of the community agree about the
blockchain, then we denote the state by (0, 0). On the other
hand, if the pool has built k blocks onto the last ‘fork block’
where it agreed with the community, and the community has
built ℓ blocks beyond the fork block, then we denote the state
by (k, ℓ). Given the mechanisms that are in place to resolve
inconsistencies, we would expect that states (k, ℓ) for k and ℓ
greater than one or two would have a very low probability of
occurrence.
A. The pool mines honestly
We assume that the pool discovers new blocks at rate
λ1, while the rest of the community does so at rate λ2,
with λ2 > λ1. Without paying attention to node locations,
Decker and Wattenhofer [1] observed that it is reasonable
to model communication delays with exponential random
variables. Since an exponential assumption also helps with
analytic tractability, we make such an assumption in this first
model. Specifically, we assume that the time that it takes to
communicate a discovery of a block from the pool to the
community and vice-versa is exponentially-distributed with
parameter µ≫ λ2.
If the system is in a state (k, ℓ) with k 6= ℓ, then it returns
to state (0, 0) once communication has occurred, because then
the pool and the community will agree about the new state
of the blockchain. However, if k = ℓ ≥ 1, then the pool and
the community have different, but equal length, versions of
the blockchain and will continue mining on the blockchain as
they see it. The system therefore remains in state (k, k) until
a new block is discovered.
The Markov model has transition rates
q((k, ℓ), (k + 1, ℓ)) = λ1, k ≥ 0, ℓ ≥ 0 (4)
q((k, ℓ), (k, ℓ+ 1)) = λ2, k ≥ 0, ℓ ≥ 0 (5)
q((k, ℓ), (0, 0)) = µ, k 6= ℓ (6)
q((k, ℓ), (k′, ℓ′)) = 0, otherwise. (7)
The first two types of transition, reflected in (4) and (5),
occur when the pool (respectively the community) mine a
block, while the third, in (6), occurs once communication has
occurred when the chain is in a state (k, ℓ) with k 6= ℓ.
This latter rate is a simplification of what could have been
assumed: if |k − ℓ| ≥ 2, there are multiple communication
tasks in progress, reporting the last |k − ℓ| block discoveries
in the longest branch and it is only when the communication
reporting the discovery of the final block on the longest branch
arrives that the state of the system returns to (0, 0). For the
sake of tractability in this simple first model, this is the only
transition that we have taken into account. As we observed
above, states with |k − ℓ| ≥ 2 have a very low probability of
occurrence and we can expect that this modification will not
have a great effect on the stationary distribution.
The equations for the stationary distribution are
π(0, 0) (λ1 + λ2) =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
ℓ=0
π(k, ℓ)µI(k 6= ℓ), (8)
for k 6= ℓ,
π(k, ℓ) (λ1 + λ2 + µ) = π(k − 1, ℓ)λ1I(k > 0)
+ π(k, ℓ− 1)λ2I(ℓ > 0) (9)
and, for k = ℓ,
π((k, ℓ)) (λ1 + λ2) = π(k − 1, ℓ)λ1I(k > 0)
+ π(k, ℓ− 1)λ2I(ℓ > 0). (10)
To express the solution of these equations, we need to define
a function n(k, ℓ; i) which denotes the number of paths that
start at the origin and finish at (k, ℓ), take steps on the integer
lattice in the directions (1, 0) (north) and (0, 1) (east) and
which contain exactly i points (j, j) for j > 0.
As an example, we can see that n(3, 2; 2) = 4 because
there are four paths
[(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (3, 2)],
[(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 2)],
[(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (3, 2)], and
[(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 2)]
that link the origin to (3, 2), containing two points of the form
(j, j) for j > 0.
With n(k, ℓ; i) = 0 for i > min(k, ℓ), n(k, 0; 0) =
n(0, ℓ; 0) = 1 for all k, ℓ > 0, the n(k, ℓ; i) for kℓ 6= 0 are
given by the recursion
n(k, ℓ; i)
= I(k = ℓ) [n(k − 1, ℓ; i− 1) + n(k, ℓ− 1; i− 1)]
+ I(k 6= ℓ) [n(k − 1, ℓ; i) + n(k, ℓ− 1; i)] . (11)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the numbers T (k, i) = n(k, k; i) are known
in the literature. They give the number of Grand Dyck paths
from (0, 0) to (2k, 0) that meet the x-axis i times, which is
a simple transformation of our definition. An expression for
these numbers [9, Equation 6.22] is
T (k, i) =
i2i
(
2k−i
k
)
2k − i . (12)
For k 6= ℓ, the numbers n(k, ℓ; i) do not appear in the
Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences [10], and we are not aware
of a previous instance where they have been used. However,
in a private communication, Trevor Welsh [11], produced an
expression for n(k, ℓ; i) with k 6= ℓ. He showed that, for k > ℓ,
n(k, ℓ; i) = n(ℓ, k; i) =
(k − ℓ+ i)2i(k+ℓ−ik )
k + ℓ− i , (13)
which generalises (12) in an elegant way.
With the numbers n(k, ℓ; i) in hand, we are in a position
to write down the stationary distribution of the Markov chain.
Theorem 2.1: The stationary distribution of the Markov
chain defined above has the form
π(k, ℓ) = π(0, 0)λk1λ
ℓ
2
min(k,ℓ)∑
i=0
(|k − ℓ|+ i)2i(k+ℓ−ik )
(k + ℓ− i)(λ1 + λ2)i(λ1 + λ2 + µ)k+ℓ−i , (14)
where π(0, 0) is determined by normalisation.
Proof: The result is established by using (11) to verify
that (14) satisfies (8), (9) and (10).
For the case where, λ1 = 0.6/hr, λ2 = 5.4/hr (which cor-
responds to the pool having 10% of the processing power) and
µ = 285/hr, corresponding to Decker and Wattenhofer’s [1]
observed average communication delay of 12.6 seconds, the
values of π(k, ℓ) for k, ℓ = 0, . . . , 3 are given in Table I.
We see that the pool and the community agree about the
blockchain 97.5% of the time, the community has a block that
the pool is yet to hear about for about 1.8% of the time, the
TABLE I. THE STATIONARY PROBABILITIES π(k, ℓ) FOR
k, ℓ = 0, . . . , 3, WHEN THE POOL MINES HONESTLY.
(k, ℓ) 0 1 2 3
0 0.9757 0.0181 0.0003 0.0000
1 0.0020 0.0037 0.0001 0.0000
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
pool has a block that the community hasn’t heard about for
0.2% of the time, while the pool and the community have
versions of the blockchain with a single different final block
about 0.4% of the time. All other possibilities have a stationary
probability less than 10−3, which supports the intuition that
splits in the blockchain with branches of length greater than
one occur with low probability.
Each time that the blockchain is in a state (1, 1) and a
new block is mined, approximately one orphan block will be
created. This is because the new state will become (1, 2) or
(2, 1) and, with high-probability, no other state change will
occur before the successful communication returns the state to
(0, 0). The block on the shorter branch will then become an
orphan block. With these parameter values, the rate of creation
of orphan blocks is approximately π(1, 1)(λ1 + λ2) = 0.022
per hour, which translates to an average of about 0.53 per day.
Readers will note that this value is much less than the
average number of orphan blocks that are observed each day
in the real Bitcoin network, which lies between two and three.
The discrepancy is explained by the fact that, in this simple
model, we have assumed instantaneous communication within
the pool and within the community. We have not counted
orphan blocks caused by communication delays within the pool
and within the community, which occur in the real network.
However, we believe that the model still has interest because,
as we shall see in Section II-B, it can be used to demonstrate
that the rate of production of orphan blocks becomes much
higher if the pool is using a block-hiding strategy such as
selfish-mine.
B. The pool uses the selfish-mine strategy
Now we assume that the pool is using the selfish mine
strategy described by Eyal and Sirer in [2]. As in the model
of Section II-A, we assume that the pool discovers blocks at
rate λ1 and the community discovers blocks at rate λ2, with
λ1 < λ2, independently of the state.
Under the selfish-mine strategy, the pool does not neces-
sarily publish blocks immediately it discovers them. Rather, it
keeps them secret until it finds out that the community has
discovered a block, and then publishes one or more of its
blocks in response to this news. Most commonly, this will
occur when the pool has a single block Bp that it has kept
secret from the community and then it is notified that the
community has discovered a block Bh. The pool’s response
to this news is immediately to publish Bp, hoping that some
of the community will mine on it. Whether or not this happens,
the pool will keep mining on its own version of the blockchain.
The situation resolves itself when the next block is discovered,
and the state becomes either (2, 1) or (1, 2), in which case,
with high probability, the state will revert to (0, 0) once
communication has taken place.
Since we have assumed that communication is instanta-
neous within the pool and community, but takes time from
one to the other, Eyal and Sirer’s parameter γ, the proportion
of the honest community that mines on the pool’s recently-
released block when the state is (1, 1), is equal to zero. Thus,
when the state is (1, 1), a new block will be created on the
pool’s leaf at rate λ1 and on the community’s leaf at rate λ2.
If the pool has a lead that is greater than or equal to three
(a rare occurrence), it does nothing until it is notified of the
discovery of a block by the community. It then publishes its
first block. However, since the pool and the community will
still keep working on the blocks at the ends of their respective
branches, this does not affect the state of the system, and
therefore we put q((k, ℓ), (0, 0)) = 0 when ℓ ≤ k − 2.
If the pool has a lead of exactly two and it is notified of
the discovery of a block by the community, the system moves
to state (2, 1) (or, indeed, the very unlikely states (3, 2), (4, 3)
etc.), and then the pool will publish all its blocks. Once the
communication of the final block has occurred, the rest of the
community will start working on the longer pool branch, thus
returning the state of the system to (0, 0). When it publishes
blocks in this situation, the pool is ‘cashing-in’ on the lead that
it has built up, rendering useless the work that the community
has been doing on its branch. This behaviour is reflected in our
Markov model by putting q((k, k−1), (0, 0)) = µ when k ≥ 2,
where the time taken to communicate a block from the pool
to the community and vice-versa is exponentially-distributed
with parameter µ≫ λ2.
Finally, we have q((k, ℓ), (0, 0)) = µ when k < ℓ, because
the honest miners always publish blocks that they discover, and
the pool has no choice but to build on the community’s version
of the blockchain if it is longer. As above and in Section II-A,
we are taking into account only the communication that reports
the discovery of the final block in the community’s chain in
assigning this transition rate.
Our model of the state of the blockchain when the pool is
using the selfish-mine strategy has transition rates
q((k, ℓ), (k + 1, ℓ)) = λ1, k ≥ 0, ℓ ≥ 0, (15)
q((k, ℓ), (k, ℓ+ 1)) = λ2, k ≥ 0, ℓ ≥ 0, (16)
q((k, ℓ), (0, 0)) = µ, k < ℓ, (17)
q((k, k − 1), (0, 0)) = µ, k ≥ 2, (18)
q((k, ℓ), (k′, ℓ′)) = 0, otherwise. (19)
The equations for the stationary distribution are
π(0, 0) (λ1 + λ2) =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
ℓ=k+1
π(k, ℓ)µ
+
∞∑
k=2
π(k, k − 1)µ, (20)
for ℓ > k,
π(k, ℓ) (λ1 + λ2 + µ) = π(k − 1, ℓ)λ1I(k > 0)
+ π(k, ℓ − 1)λ2I(ℓ > 0), (21)
for ℓ = k,
π(k, ℓ) (λ1 + λ2) = π(k − 1, ℓ)λ1I(k > 0)
+ π(k, ℓ− 1)λ2I(ℓ > 0), (22)
TABLE II. THE STATIONARY PROBABILITIES π(k, ℓ) FOR
k, ℓ = 0, . . . , 3, WHEN THE POOL MINES SELFISHLY.
(k, ℓ) 0 1 2 3
0 0.8177 0.0121 0.0002 0.0000
1 0.0818 0.0749 0.0011 0.0000
2 0.0082 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000
3 0.0008 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000
for ℓ = k − 1,
π(k, ℓ) (λ1 + λ2 + µ) = π(k − 1, ℓ)λ1I(k > 0)
+ π(k, ℓ− 1)λ2I(ℓ > 0) (23)
and, for ℓ < k otherwise,
π(k, ℓ) (λ1 + λ2) = π(k − 1, ℓ)λ1
+ π(k, ℓ − 1)λ2I(ℓ > 0). (24)
Like the Markov chain in Section II-A, this Markov chain has
countably-many states but, unlike the former chain, it does
not appear to be possible to write down a simple closed-
form expression similar to (14) for its stationary distribution.
However, as we observed in respect of the model of Section
II-A, the stationary probabilities decay very quickly to zero
as k and ℓ increase, and we can get a good approximation
by truncating the state space and augmenting the transition
rates in a physically reasonable way so that the Markov chain
remains irreducible. To get the results that we report below,
we truncated the state space so that only states with k+ ℓ ≤ 6
were considered and solved the resulting linear equations in
Matlab. For the same parameters that we used in the model
above, Table II contains the stationary probabilities for the
subset of these states where k, ℓ ≤ 3.
We see now that the blockchain is in a state where the
pool and the community agree for only 82% of the time. For
about 8% of the time, the pool is working on a block that it
has kept secret and, for another 7.5% of the time the pool and
the community have separate branches of length one. As we
observed in Section II-A, each time that the blockchain is in
state (1, 1) and a new block is mined, an orphan block will
eventually be created. Also, each time the pool publishes a
block in response to the community finding a block, a further
orphan block is created. The conditions for the latter event
occur with a probability of the order of 10−4, and we therefore
see that the rate of creation of orphan blocks if the pool is
playing the selfish mine strategy is approximately π(1, 1)(λ1+
λ2) = 0.4494 per hour, which is about 10.8 per day.
Comparing with the similar calculation in Section II-A in
which the same parameters λ1, λ2 and µ led to a rate of
creation of orphan blocks of 0.5 per day, this illustrates that the
increased rate of orphan block creation has the potential to be
used as a diagnostic tool as to whether there is a pool of miners
that have adopted the selfish-mine strategy. Specifically, the
community can monitor whether a significant proportion of the
miners is using any type of block-hiding strategy by looking
for increases in the rate of production of orphan blocks. In
particular, it would be possible to detect the presence of a
pool of miners implementing the selfish-mine strategy in this
way.
III. EYAL AND SIRER’S PARAMETER γ
In the model of Section II, we assumed that the pool
and the community were remote from each other, so that
communication within the pool and within the community
could effectively be considered to be instantaneous, while
communication between the pool and community incurred
a delay. This is clearly unrealistic. Indeed, it is likely that
the miners of the pool are distributed throughout the honest
community and that there is delay in communication between
any two miners, whether they are both in the pool or not.
To illustrate the type of approach that can be taken to
model this situation, we shall make some assumptions about
the spatial relationships and the communication delays be-
tween pool miners and miners in the honest community, and
derive some insights about the behaviour of the blockchain.
While the assumptions would need to be varied to reflect the
characteristics of a mining pool in the actual Bitcoin network,
we believe that the insights hold in general.
Specifically, we assume that the pool miners are distributed
according to a spatial Poisson point process Ψ = {Xi} with
constant intensity ν > 0 over the same region R2 that contains
the honest miners, so Ψ can be considered a random set of pool
miner locations {Xi}. The Poisson process is widely used for
stochastic models of communication networks, for example,
the positioning of transmitters [12]. Although we restrict our-
selves to Euclidean space R2 for illustration purposes, Baccelli,
Norros and Fabien [13] introduced a general framework using
Poisson processes to study peer-to-peer networks, which was
then later used by Baccelli et al. [14] to study the scalability of
these networks. It has been remarked [13], [14] that the Poisson
process in this model can be defined on other spaces more
suitable for studying networks such as hyperbolic space [15],
which offers a possible avenue for further research.
Furthermore, we assume that the communication delay
between two Miners Mi and Mj , whether pool or honest,
that lie a distance dij apart is normally distributed with
a mean kdij proportional to this distance and a constant
variance σ2, independently of other transmission delays. This
assumption does not contradict Decker and Wattenhofer [1]
who modelled the unconditional communication delays with
exponential random variables.
The quantity that we are interested in is Eyal and Sirer’s [2]
proportion γ of the honest community that mines on a block
released by the selfish-mine pool in response to the honest
community publishing a block. With reference to Figure 2, we
are interested in analysing the communication between two
honest Miners M1 and M2 that lie a distance d12 from each
other. Miner M3 is the pool miner for which the length of the
path between M1 and M2 via M3 is minimised. Denote the
(random) distances between M1 and M3 and M3 and M2 by
D13 and D32 respectively.
Consider the situation where the pool has discovered a
block Bp that it has kept secret from the honest community and
then honest Miner M1 subsequently discovers and publishes
a block Bh. The selfish-mine strategy dictates that Miner M3
should release Bp immediately it receives Bh from M1. We
are interested in the probability that the other honest Miner M2
will receive Bp before Bh because, with equal length branches,
it will then mine on the branch that it heard about first.
d12
x13 x32
D13
D32
M1
M3
M2
Fig. 2. P (D > x) is the probability that no pool miner is located in the
ellipse with x13 + x32 = x.
Making the further assumption that Miner M3 requires no
time to process the information that a block has arrived from
M1 and release Bp (which could be varied), γ is effectively
the probability that communication from M1 to M3 and then
M3 to M2 occurs faster than direct communication from M1
to M2.
Again with reference to Figure 2, Miner M3 is chosen so
that the distance D = D13 +D32 is minimal amongst all of
the pool miners. This means that, for any x < D, there is no
pool miner in the ellipse whose foci are the locations of honest
Miners M1 and M2 (taken to be at (−d12/2, 0) and (d12/2, 0)
respectively) and semi-axes
a =
x
2
, b =
1
2
(x2 − d212)1/2. (25)
Hence
P (D > x) = e−νA(x), x ≥ d12, (26)
where
A(x) =
πx
4
(x2 − d212)1/2 (27)
is the area of the ellipse (25). It follows that
FD(x) ≡ P (D ≤ x) = 1− e−νA(x), x ≥ d12. (28)
Conditional on the random distances D13 and D32, the trans-
mission times T13 and T32 are independent and normally dis-
tributed with means kD13 and kD32 respectively and common
variance σ2, and therefore the difference ∆ ≡ T13+T32−T12 is
a normally distributed random variable with mean k(D−d12)
and variance 3σ2. Since the triangle inequality ensures that the
mean of ∆, k(D − d12) is nonnegative, we immediately see
that γ˜ = P (T < 0) is less than or equal to 0.5. Furthermore,
P (∆ < 0|D = x) = Φ
(
k(d12 − x)√
3σ
)
, (29)
where Φ is the distribution function of a standard normal
random variable. Integrating with respect to the probability
density of D derived from (28), we see that the probability
that the honest Miner M2 receives Bp before Bh is given by
γ˜ = ν
∫
∞
d12
A′(x)e−νA(x)Φ
(
k(d12 − x)√
3σ
)
dx. (30)
A change of variable w = A(x) results in a numerically
tractable Laplace transform
γ˜ = ν
∫
∞
0
e−νwΦ
(
k(d12 −A−1(w))√
3σ
)
dw, (31)
TABLE III. VALUES OF γ˜ FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF d12 AND ν .
(d12, ν) 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6
1 0.0341 0.0654 0.0942 0.1207
4 0.2034 0.3144 0.3779 0.4160
8 0.3687 0.4505 0.4758 0.4860
12 0.4430 0.4835 0.4925 0.4958
where
A−1(w) =
1√
2
([(8w/π)2 + d412]
1/2 + d212)
1/2. (32)
It is clear that γ˜ depends on k and σ only through the ratio
k/σ. Taking this ratio to be equal to 50, Table III presents
some values of γ˜ as the distance d12 between M1 and M2
and the density ν of pool miners are varied. We see that, as
d12 increases, the value of γ˜ approaches its theoretical limit
of 0.5. The rate of convergence is faster if ν is larger, but
the parameter γ˜ is more sensitive to the distance d12 between
honest Miners M1 and M2 than it is to the intensity of the
Poisson process of pool miner locations. The intuition behind
this is that, when d12 is large, there is a high probability that
there will be a pool miner close to the straight line between
Miners M1 and M2 even if the value of ν is only moderate.
This effect is illustrated in Figure 3, which presents an
example where d12 = 12 and ν = 0.4. Honest Miners
M1 ⊙ and M2 ⊗ are located at the points (−6, 0) and (6, 0)
respectively. The round circles ◦ are the locations of pool
miners, and the marked pool miner • is the pool Miner M3,
that minimises the distance D13+D32. Note that, even though
the pool miners are not densely packed, M3 lies very close to
the straight line between M1 and M2.
Under the assumptions of the model, the above analysis
calculates the probability that the pool miner M3 closest to
the straight line between honest Miners M1 and M2 succeeds
in transmitting Bp to M2 before M2 directly receives Bh.
Miner M3 is the pool miner with the highest probability of
succeeding in this transmission. However, there might be other
pool miners that have a round-trip distance that is not much
further than that via M3, and a complete analysis should take
into account the possibility that one of these miners succeeds
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Fig. 3. An example simulation of the Poisson model with d12 = 12 and
ν = 0.4.
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Fig. 4. A simulation where the pool node ⊗ with the shortest round trip
time is not the pool node • that lies closest to the straight line between M1
⊙ and M2 ✸; d12 = 12 and ν = 0.2.
when M3 does not. Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 4,
where the Miner M3 closest to the straight line between Miners
M1 and M2 is not the miner that had the smallest value of the
round-trip propagation delay.
More precisely, instead of calculating the probability that
the communication time via the pool node M3 that minimises
the round-trip distance is less than the direct transmission
time, we should calculate the probability that the minimum
of the communication times via all the dishonest nodes is less
than the direct transmission time. Based upon our assumptions
that the dishonest nodes are distributed as a spatial Poisson
process and that transmission delays are normally-distributed,
the following result helps with this calculation.
Let ρ(y) denote the distance from honest miner M1 to
miner M2 via an intermediate node located at y ∈ R2. Then
the distances
{Di} = {ρ(Xi) : Xi ∈ Ψ}
from Miner M1 to Miner M2 via dishonest users {Xi} = Ψ
form a point process on the infinite interval [d12,∞) and the
following lemma is a consequence of the Mapping Theorem,
see, for example, Kingman [16, page 17].
Lemma 3.1: The point process {Di} is an inhomogeneous
Poisson point process with intensity (or mean) measure given
by
ΛD(x) := ΛD ([d12, x]) = νA(x), x ≥ d12 (33)
where A(x) is given by (27).
We can make further use of the Mapping Theorem to obtain
a lemma about the Poisson nature of the round trip times.
Lemma 3.2: The point process {Ti} is an inhomogeneous
Poisson point process on (−∞,∞) with intensity measure
given by
ΛT (y) := ΛT ((−∞, y]) = ν
∫
∞
d12
A′(x)Φ
(
y − kx√
2σ
)
dx,
(34)
where A(x) is given by (27).
TABLE IV. VALUES OF γ FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF d12 AND ν .
(d12, ν) 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6
1 0.0347 0.0678 0.0992 0.1292
4 0.2298 0.3914 0.5081 0.5946
8 0.4891 0.6937 0.7955 0.8530
12 0.6695 0.8372 0.9018 0.9336
Proof: We can write Ti = kDi + Ei where the sequence
{Ei} consists of i.i.d. N(0, 2σ2) random variables, indepen-
dent of the sequence {Di}, where, in the theory of marked
point process, each Ei is referred to as a random mark. By the
Marking Theorem [16, page 55], the two-dimensional process
(Di, Ei) is also a Poisson process, with intensity measure on
rectangles of the form (a, b]× (−∞, y] given by
ΛD,E(a, b, y) = νΦ
(
y√
2σ
)∫ b
a
A′(x)dx,
and the Poisson nature of the process {Ti} follows again from
the Mapping Theorem [16, page 17]. To get the expression
(34) for the intensity measure of {Ti}, we condition on the
possible value of Di that leads to a given value of Ti.
The probability γ that the pool block released by M3 will
reach M2 before the block published by M1 is the probability
that there exists a point of the Poisson process {Ti} less than
the direct transmission time T12. This latter time is normally
distributed with mean kd12 and variance σ2. If such a point
exists, then there will be at least one pool node where the
round-trip time is shorter than the direct time.
Conditional on T12 = t12, we can use Lemma 3.2 to write
the probability of the above event as
P (minTi ≤ T12|T12 = t12) = 1− exp(−ΛT (t12)), (35)
where ΛT is given by (34). This expression can also be derived
by considering minTi as extremal shot-noise, see, for example,
Baccelli and Błaszczyszyn [12, Proposition 2.13].
Now, integrating with respect to the density of T12, the
unconditional probability that there is a point of the round trip
process which is less than the direct transmission time is
γ =
1
√
2piσ
∫
∞
−∞
(1− exp(−ΛT (u))) exp
(
−(u− kd12)2
2σ2
)
du
= 1−
1
√
2piσ
∫
∞
−∞
exp
(
−(u− kd12)2
2σ2
− ΛT (u)
)
du. (36)
For the same values of d12 and ν that were used in Table III,
again with k/σ = 50, Table IV gives the values of γ calculated
via (36).
We notice first that the values of γ in Table IV are all higher
than than the values of γ˜ depicted in Table III, reflecting the
fact that pool nodes other than the pool node that is closest
to the straight line between M1 and M2 might lie on the path
that minimises the round-trip delay. Furthermore, we see that
the values of γ are more sensitive to the density ν of the pool
nodes than the values of γ˜. This makes sense because, when
the density of pool nodes is high, there are likely to be more
pool nodes, other than the one that minimises the round-trip
distance between M1 and M2, that have short round-trip times.
Finally, we note that when distance d12 between nodes M1 and
M2 is high, and the density ν of pool nodes is also high, the
probability γ can be arbitrarily high, for example exceeding
0.9 when d12 = 12 and ν = 1.6, even though the probability
γ˜ cannot be greater than 0.5.
The overall lesson from the analysis in this section is that,
with randomly-varying communication delays, it is advanta-
geous for the pool to maximise the number of nodes that
release a secret block in response to a block being mined
by the honest community. This maximises the probability of
at least one of them succeeding in transmitting its released
block to the other honest nodes before they receive the direct
communication from M1.
In fact, a similar observation can also be applied to the
honest community itself. Rather than relying on the direct
communication between M1 and M2 to occur faster than
round-trip communication via the pool nodes, the honest
community could also employ intermediate nodes as relays
and there would be a good chance that faster communication
would be achieved via one of these. Analysing such a situation
using the techniques of this section is an interesting question
for future research.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
We developed two blockchain simulators, one in C++ and
one in Java, the latter based on the DESMO-J simulation
framework [17]. We used the former to simulate a network
of 1,000 nodes. The simulation worked as follows.
• The positions of the nodes were selected uniformly at
random on the set [0, 1000]× [0, 1000].
• Blocks were mined at randomly-selected nodes at the
instants of a Poisson process. On average, one block
was mined every 10 minutes.
• Each node maintained a local copy of the blockchain.
• The communication delay between two nodes was a
random variable sampled from a normal distribution
whose mean was proportional to the Euclidean dis-
tance between the two nodes and whose coefficient of
variation CV was kept constant. Note that this differed
from the delay model described in Section III, where
we assumed that the normally distributed communi-
cation delay had a constant variance σ2. In the model
discussed in this section, the variance increases with
the distance between the nodes.
• A total of 10,000 blocks were mined. This represents
70 days of mining.
• Each simulation experiment was replicated 12 times
and 95% confidence intervals for all performance
measures that we shall discuss below were computed.
• The simulation results are generally presented below
in the form of plots. The plotted points are sample
means. Confidence interval half widths are shown
if they are distinguishable, otherwise they are omit-
ted. The plotted points are connected by continuous
curves constructed from segments of cubic polynomi-
als whose coefficients are found by weighting the data
points.
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Fig. 5. The average number of blockchain splits per 24 hours.
A. Honest mining
Figure 5 shows the average number b(t) of blockchain
splits per 24 hours as a function of the communication
delay t, averaged over all the nodes in the network. The
delay was varied from 1 msec to 100 seconds. Both axes are
logarithmic. Fitting a straight line to the log-log plot yields
b(t) = 0.2508t0.9695 so that the average split rate was almost
linearly proportional to the average communication delay.
The simulation experiments showed that when the expected
communication delay was 10 seconds, on average 2.34 splits
were observed per 24 hours. This is roughly in agreement with
the observations made by Decker and Wattenhofer [1] that an
average communication delay of 12.6 seconds results in an
average split rate of 2.4 per 24 hours in the actual Bitcoin
network.
Suppose there is a (hypothetical) mechanism that is invoked
when a block is attached to a blockchain. The mechanism
can simultaneously inspect the blockchains at all the nodes
and report if each blockchain has a single leaf and if all the
blockchains are identical: if this condition occurs then the
blockchains are said to be synchronised.
Consider an instant of time t0 when the mechanism reports
that the blockchains are synchronised. Let t > t0 denote the
first time instant after t0 when the mechanism reports that
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Fig. 6. The average dwell time.
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the blockchains are not synchronised. Let t′ > t denote the
first time instant after t when the mechanism reports that
the blockchains are again synchronised. We shall refer to the
interval t′ − t as the dwell time.
Figure 6 plots the average dwell time as a function of the
average communication delay. Again, the axes are logarithmic.
The figure shows that the dwell time was also almost linearly
proportional to the average communication delay.
As the average communication delay increased, the number
of splits increased and the time until the splits were resolved
and the blockchains were synchronised increased. The average
dwell time exceeded 10 minutes (the average time between
mining events) when the average communication delay was of
the order of 100 seconds.
B. Dishonest mining
In remainder of this section we shall report the application
of our simulator to the situation where a pool of miners used
Eyal and Sirer’s selfish-mine approach [2]. The details of our
implementation of the selfish-mine algorithm are given in the
Appendix.
As in Section I-E, we use α to denote the fraction of the
total computing capacity of the network that is controlled by
the dishonest pool, and γ to denote the probability that an
honest miner will mine on the block Bp, rather than Bh.
When the communication delays are zero, according to
Eyal and Sirer’s expression (3), the minimum proportion of
computing power required for profitable selfish mining ranges
from α > 0 (if γ = 1) to α > 1/3 (if γ = 0).
We simulated the communication delays between miners in
the network as independent normal random variables whose
mean was proportional to distance between the miners and
whose coefficient of variation CV was kept constant. If CV =
0 then, by the triangle inequality, we would have expected Bh
to reach M2 before Bp reaches M2, unless the three nodes M1,
M2 and M3 are collinear, which is an event of probability zero.
This expectation was confirmed in the simulation.
However, if CV > 0 then Bp can arrive at M2 before
Bh, and so γ will be positive. We used our simulator to
investigate the value of γ as the number of pool miners was
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varied from from 0 to 500, and thus the proportion α of pool
computing power was varied from 0 to 0.5. Figure 7 presents
the observed proportion γ̂ as a function of α for several values
of the coefficient of variation CV . The figure confirms our
expectation that, when CV > 0 and there are dishonest miners
present, then γ̂ ought to be positive.
Furthermore, the value of γ̂ increased quickly as a function
of α even when CV was taken to be quite small. This
reinforces the insight that we gained in Section III that, because
there were many possibilities for the intermediate pool node,
the probability of a communication path via one of them
beating the direct communication was unexpectedly high.
The fact that an honest miner Mi is mining on a block Bp
revealed by the dishonest pool does not guarantee that the next
block to be attached to the blockchain Ci at node Mi will be
linked to block Bp. If Ci has two leaves Bp and Bh and a
block Bnew arrives from another node, then Bnew can attach
to Bp or to Bh.
Let Γ denote the probability that the next block attached
to the blockchain at an honest node was linked to block Bp.
Figure 8 shows that the sample means of Γ indicated by the
points (+,×, ∗,✷) corresponded closely with the theoretical
value Γ = α+ (1− α)γ given by the continuous curves.
C. The relative pool revenue
Let Nh denote the total number of blocks mined by the
honest miners that were included in the blockchain at the
end of the experiment. The revenue earned from these blocks
has been credited to the honest miners. Let Np denote the
total number of blocks mined by the pool that were finally
included in the blockchain. Define the relative pool revenue
R = Np/(Nh +Np).
Figure 9 presents a map of the relative pool revenue R as
a function of the total number of miners (varied from 100 to
1,000) and the pool size as a fraction α of the total number,
with the average communication delay fixed at 10 seconds. The
figure demonstrates that the relative pool revenue was roughly
constant with respect to the number of nodes, and increased
with increasing values of α. Significantly, R became greater
than 0.5 when α reached 0.4, which indicates that the pool
was earning more than its fair share of revenue in this region.
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Fig. 9. The relative pool revenue R in networks of increasing size.
D. Detecting the presence of dishonest miners
In this section and the following sections, we follow the
theme of Section II, and discuss how the honest miners can
detect the presence of a pool of miners implementing the
selfish-mine strategy. Consider a network of 1,000 miners,
with an average communication delay of 10 seconds and a
coefficient of variation CV = 0.001.
Figure 10 presents the average number of blockchain splits
per 24 hours as a function of the relative size α of the
dishonest pool. As the size of the dishonest pool increased,
the average number of splits per unit time increased by an
order of magnitude. Thus the simulation has confirmed the
conclusion of the model that we investigated in Section II that
an increase in the split rate can provide a means for the honest
miners to detect the presence of the dishonest miners.
In a network of 1,000 nodes, assuming that all miners have
the same computational power, each miner expects to earn an
average of 25 × 6/1000 = 0.15 bitcoins per hour. Figure 11
shows that as the number of dishonest miners increased, the
honest miners earned less than the expected average of 0.15
bitcoins per hour. This may also afford a means for the honest
miners to detect the presence of a pool of miners implementing
the selfish-mine strategy.
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Fig. 10. The average number of blockchain splits per 24 hours.
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E. Dishonest mining is not profitable
Figure 12 presents the relative pool revenue R as a function
of the relative size α of the dishonest pool. The figure shows
that for α > 0.25 dishonest mining outperformed honest min-
ing. However, this does not imply that the pool incorporated
more blocks into the main branch than it would have if the
dishonest miners had followed the bitcoin rules.
Figure 13 illustrates this by exhibiting the performance of
both the dishonest pool and the honest miners in terms of the
numbers of blocks they mined that end up in the main branch.
It presents the average number of blocks mined per hour by
the pool, by the honest miners and in total, that were included
in the long-term blockchain as a function of the relative size
α of the dishonest pool. The average block mining rate was
held constant at 6 blocks per hour.
The figure demonstrates that, when there is a pool imple-
menting selfish-mine, both the pool and the honest miners were
worse off than they would have been if no dishonest mining
was present. The total number of blocks that the pool and
honest nodes incorporated into the main branch when dishonest
mining was present was always less than the number that
would have been incorporated if dishonest mining were not
present.
We caution that the above observation is made under the
assumption that the difficulty of the cryptographic problem
described in Section I-A was held constant. In the real Bitcoin
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Fig. 13. The average block mining rate.
blockchain, the network would respond to an overall decrease
in the rate of blocks being successfully mined by reducing the
difficulty of the cryptographic problem. This decreased value
of the difficulty may itself afford a means for the honest miners
to detect the presence of the dishonest miners.
F. Adoption threshold
Figure 12 shows that in the range 0 < α ≤ 0.25 there is no
incentive for a solo miner to adopt the selfish-mine strategy,
since by doing so a miner will be become part of a pool that
has a lower relative pool revenue than it would have if all
the members of the pool were honest. Moreover, in the range
0 < α ≤ 0.25, solo honest miners benefit (in terms of their
relative pool revenue R̂ = 1 − R) from the activities of the
dishonest pool. A larger participant may already possess more
than 25% of the network mining capacity and may be able
to attract miners with a promise of an enhanced pool revenue.
However, as shown in Section IV-E, these miners will earn less
than they would have earned had they remained honest, and if
they perceive this they may withdraw from the dishonest pool.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have studied the dynamics of the Bitcoin
blockchain when propagation delays are taken into account,
with specific reference to how the blockchain behaves when
there is a pool of miners using the selfish-mine strategy
proposed by Eyal and Sirer [2]. Our approach has been
to construct simple models that provide insight into system
behaviour, without attempting to reflect the detailed structure
of the Bitcoin network.
In Section II we used a simple Markov chain model to
demonstrate that it is possible for the whole mining community
to detect block-hiding behaviour, such as that used in selfish-
mine, by monitoring the rate of production of orphan blocks.
In Section III, our attention turned to Eyal and Sirer’s
parameter γ, which is the proportion of the honest community
that mine on a previously-secret block released by the selfish-
mine pool in response to the honest community mining a block.
When there is no variability in the propagation delay, it follows
from the triangle equality (at least within the Poisson network
model that we assumed) that the value of γ is zero. However,
the value of γ can increase surprisingly quickly with increasing
variability of propagation delay. A key observation is that if all
pool nodes release the secret block as soon as they are notified
of the discovery of the public block, the chances of one of
them beating the direct communication can be very high. We
did not study the counter-balancing effect that would occur if
all honest miners relayed the honest miner’s block in the same
way. A study of this would be an interesting topic for future
research.
Finally, in Section IV, we used simulation to verify the
observations that we made in Sections II and III, under slightly
different assumptions. We also were able to study the long-
term rate of block production, and hence revenue generation
under both honest mining and selfish-mine strategies and make
some observations about when selfish-mine is profitable. An
important observation is that, in the absence of a relaxation of
the difficulty of the mining cryptographic problem, the long-
term rate of block production will decrease if a pool of miners
is implementing the selfish-mine strategy. It can thus happen
that, even if the selfish pool is earning a greater proportion
of the total revenue than is indicated by its share of the total
computational power, it is, in fact, earning revenue at a lesser
rate than would be the case if it simply followed the protocol.
This observation makes intuitive sense, since the whole point
of selfish-mine is to put other miners in a position where they
are wasting resources on mining blocks that have no chance
of being included in the long-term blockchain.
We emphasize that our models, both analytic and simula-
tion, are idealised. It would be an interesting line for future
research to use network tomography techniques to discover the
topology of the actual Bitcoin network and then employ the
analytical and simulation techniques that we have discussed
in this paper to study the effect of propagation delay on the
dynamic evolution of the blockchain.
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APPENDIX
The pseudo-code presented in Algorithm 1 summarises the
actions of a dishonest node.
Algorithm 1 Selfish-mine algorithm at a dishonest node i.
// Initialise the blockchain at dishonest node i.
function INITIALISE
blockchain := publicly known blocks
secretExtension := empty; race := FALSE
mine on the last block in the blockchain
end function
// Dishonest node i attaches a secret Block to its secretExtension.
function SECRETMINE(block Block)
append Block to secretExtension; ns := ns + 1
if race then
publish Block; race := FALSE; secretExtension := empty
else if |secretExtension| > 5 then // prevent runaway
publish the first unpublished block of secretExtension
end if
mine on Block
end function
// Dishonest node i attaches a public/published Block to its blockchain.
// The last block on blockchain has serial number np.
// The last block on secretExtension has serial number ns.
function PUBLICMINE(block Block)
append Block to blockchain; np := np + 1
∆ := ns − np // compute the lead
if ∆ = −1 then
if race then
race := FALSE; secretExtension := empty
end if
mine on Block
else if ∆ = 0 then
race := TRUE
publish the last (and only) block of secretExtension
secretExtension := empty; mine on block ns
else if ∆ = 1 then
if |secretExtension| = 2 then
publish secretExtension; secretExtension := empty
mine on block ns
end if
else // ∆ > 1
publish the first unpublished block of secretExtension
mine on block ns
end if
end function
